Facebook, Twitter, and the Iranian Elections

From where I'm sitting, the role of facebook and twitter in these Iranian elections and the post-election aftermath can't possibly be overstated.

There were already articles circulating about the importance of social networking sites like facebook in the run-up to the elections, but since the protests in reaction to the election results broke out, facebook and twitter have been the go-to sites for so many Iranians both inside and outside the country.

And it's obviously not just Iranians relying on these sites for Iran info, since the Iran elections are the hottest topic on Twitter and Google blog searches - millions of web users worldwide are waiting for the next online postings of those brave people with (limited) Internet access inside Iran, who keep writing even as they fear being tracked and ending up in grave danger. The addresses of proxy servers are being circulated on social networking sites so as to help those inside Iran evade filters. Twitters users even persuaded twitter to postpone their web maintenance to a less "intrusive" time so that updates from those who rely on twitter in Iran wouldn't be hindered as much. Later it appeared that the US State Department had a hand in this decision, which you can read more about here and here. But this was never admitted by Twitter.

Surely the others who are also following the events from afar have noticed (as I have), Facebook and Twitter status updates are temporally way ahead of big, mainstream news sources when it comes to reporting the smaller details and keeping up with events as they develop. This article even lists guidelines so users can make the most of this new "social media" for following the events in Iran.

I can safely say I saw footage of the 'riots' embedded on Facebook and linked through Youtube posted by people in Iran (and those friends and family) way before I saw anything like it on news sites. For a moment, I saw into the face of a riot policeman up close through his transparent plastic mask as he rushed the camera-person, who then turned and started running with the rest of the crowd - the camera still filming but shaking to the point where you could only see some feet, some people's backs, the ground, and hear the screams of a woman: "don't hit, don't hit". More and more of the established news agencies are airing these home-made clips since foreign reporters were ejected and banned from the country in the days following the initial uprising.

Many people in other parts of the world here are living on Iran time. Not only figuratively because they've been urged to change their location and time and date on twitter to look as though they are in Tehran to fool the censors, but also literally, because they're actually staying up nights on end to keep up with the twitter updates that are coming in continuously. Balatarin.com has even introduced continuous live streaming in Farsi from those inside Iran.

At the same time, the 'cyberwars' have also started. The limited access because of filters on sites like Facebook and Youtube quickly became international common knowledge after the election crackdown on these sites. But Iranians succeeded in getting around these obstacles to access. The battle seemed to enter a new dimension when Tehran Bureau's site was attacked yesterday and they had to temporarily rely on Facebook updates through Iran Pages and Twitter their updates. Andrew Sullivan's site was also hacked by the Iranian government people. He is a long-time political blogger whose writing on Iran was very popular, especially in these past days. Websites outside the country being successfully brought down by Iranian government forces? Maybe I'm behind, but this was something new to me (although I have to say it's really hard to prove that this was actually done by people inside Iran. Maybe it wasn't).

Maybe Tehran Bureau was targeted because it was proving to be such a particularly powerful site, being one of the very few that mixed the best of both worlds: citizen journalism + trusted news, and effectively delivered it to a substantial outside audience. They were/are keeping up with the main Farsi language sources (as I compared my information with those of my Farsi speaking friends) and they post detailed reports from the ground. For me and the English speaking friends who are following the events, TB has become indispensable.

The site is back up now, and "stronger than before," and they have apparently even taken down several state news agency sites with their own counter-attack. I got this all from their Facebook pages. But then an Iranian contact (and techie) posted a link to this article on why those attacks can be harmful. The argument that you could be contributing to the slowdown of internet in Iran in general by launching the type of attack that overloads your target's system with requests is the most interesting. This concern has grown by virtual word of mouth over the past couple of days, as people have tried to warn others.

Clearly, one of the limits to the democratizing potentials of this powerful tool (in addition to the obvious ones such as lack of universal accessibility) is that one's ignorance of how it works, combined with increased access and lower and lower barriers to engagement in cyber-battle could be like arming the untrained. But it also seems that by gaining the experience, people increase their literacy and improve their abilities to harness the potentials of these online tools in ways that best suit their cause(s).

Just like everyone who has anything to do with the Iran elections, I have lots more to say as things are constantly happening and developing. I can't get it all out right now, but will come back to it very soon.